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Political culture theory explains political instability and change as the result of 
incongruity between mass attitudes and values on one hand, and political 
institutions on the other (Almond and Verba 1963).  Thus, the “third wave of 
democracy” that swept across the globe from 1975 to 2005 is seen, variously, as 
the result of the failure of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to supply 
sufficient economic and political goods to satisfy their citizens, or more broadly 
the mismatch between the operating norms of the regime and its constituent 
institutions and those of the mass public.  The key question that occupies public 
opinion researchers working in new democracies, however, is whether the value 
structures that questioned and de-legitimated the former authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes are sufficient to legitimate and consolidate new liberal or 
even electoral democracies.  
  
Perhaps nowhere is this issue better illustrated than in southern Africa where the 
presence of colonial and settler regimes well into the latter half of the 20
th
 
century diverged sharply with even the most minimal human aspirations for 
dignity, freedom and self-determination.  The most extreme manifestation of this 
was, of course, apartheid South Africa.  Whereas most repressive regimes at 
least made claims that they were delivering some goods valued by their 
populations (rightist regimes claimed to deliver national self-determination, 
order, or development; leftist regime claimed to deliver equality and a form of 
democracy that was more advanced than their liberal, bourgeois competitors), 
South Africa‟s ruling National Party could claim, at best, that it was protecting 
traditional indigenous cultures from the polluting impact of modernity and 
preparing Africans for self-government in their own countries. But Verwoerdian 
appeals to cultural relativism and paternalist tutelage were constantly exposed 
by the harshness of everyday life, whether in the urban townships, the farms of 
“white” South Africa, or in the Bantustan homelands, and by the near totalitarian 
reach of the apartheid regime and its intrusion into the most intimate aspects the 
lives of coloured, Indian and black South Africans. 
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Apartheid lasted for a surprisingly long time (1948 to 1994), and probably could 
have survived at least another ten years if not for the decisive reforms of FW de 
Klerk. But while we have little scientific evidence about the state of public 
attitudes amongst black South Africans, few would suggest that this was because 
black South Africans saw the regime as legitimate, or even remotely agreed with 
its basic norms and principles. Thus, in the language of political culture theory, 
apartheid ultimately fell because the norms of racial separation, racial hierarchy 
and white superiority were rejected by the vast majority of the South African 
populace.   
 
Yet while popular support for norms such as dignity, equality, freedom, non-
racialism and majority rule may have led to the demise of apartheid, it is by no 
means certain that these norms are sufficient to support a liberal democracy.  
Here we do have extensive social scientific evidence, and virtually all of it 
agrees that South Africans -- of all races --  pay minimal lip service to the idea 
of democracy, and that significant minorities would be willing to countenance 
one party rule or strong man dictatorship especially if these regimes would 
promise economic development (or may simply believe erringly that those 
regimes are consistent with democracy) (Mattes and Thiel 1998; Mattes 2001; 
Bratton and Mattes 2001; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes & 
Bratton 2007).  South Africans also display high levels of intolerance of political 
difference (Gibson & Gouws 2003) and the highest levels of xenophobia 
measured anywhere in the world (Mattes, Taylor, McDonald, Poore & 
Richmond 1999). 
 
Thus, to the extent that political culture is ultimately important to the survival 
and quality of democracy, culture change is a fundamentally important issue 
confronting South Africa. But is it possible to turn non-democrats into 
democrats? And if so, what are the key factors or processes? And is this process 
equally likely to happen across the entire public or is it more probable amongst 
certain segments or age cohorts?  Public opinion researchers have identified a 
range of different possible routes for this kind of attitude change. One possible 
route is simply to wait for sufficient time to pass whereby citizens become 
habituated to democracy after repeated exposure to and involvement in 
democratic practice (sometimes referred to as “routinization”) (Rustow 1970).  
A second route lies in (re)designing political institutions so as to give people 
greater incentives to tolerate political opponents, join civic associations, contact 
elected leaders, participate in collective action and defend democracy if it were 
under threat (Hadenius 2001). A third possible path lies in improving the quality 
of the country‟s political institutions (often referred to as institutionalization) so 
they can perform better and demonstrate to citizens that democracy can produce 
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the political and economic goods that satisfy people‟s self interests (Przeworski 
1995). 
 
A different set of potential mechanisms depend far less on individual attitude 
change across the populace and concentrate instead on achieving aggregate 
culture change through the replacement of older generations with new, more 
democratic cohorts. Changes of this type are almost all based in some way on 
what Inglehart (1990) calls the socialization hypothesis. That is, the experiences 
of late adolescence have an exceptionally powerful influence on the 
development of individual attitudes and are more powerful than subsequent 
“period” or “life cycle” effects.  However, scholars differ over exactly what it is 
that is most important during late adolescence.  One school of thought points to 
the conscious teaching of pro-democratic values and preferences to the young 
through civil society and mass media, but largely through the schooling system 
aided by reformed school curricula and, or new teaching methods (Slomczynski 
and Shabad, 1998).
1
  Scholars have documented significant increases in pro-
democratic values and attitudes in a series of newly democratic, post-
authoritarian societies such as such as West Germany (Baker et al 1981), Austria 
(Muller 1984), Italy (Sami 1980), Japan (Flanagan and Richardson 1984; 
Richardson 1974) and Spain (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986; and Montero, 
Gunther and Torcal 1997).  In each of these societies, new democratic regimes 
remoulded citizens' beliefs into a culture supportive of democracy, largely 
through committed efforts in the schools, but also in media and civil society, to 
educate a new generation of democratically minded citizens.  Dalton‟s (1994, 
471-472) description of the Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative. 
Confronted by an uncertain public commitment to democracy, the 
government undertook a massive programme to re-educate the 
public. The schools, the media and political organizations were 
mobilized behind the effort.  And the citizenry itself was changing – 
older generations raised under authoritarian regimes were being 
replaced by younger generations socialized during the postwar 
democratic era.  These efforts created a political culture congruent 
with the new institutions and processes of the Federal Republic.  
The West German public also learned democratic norms by 
continued exposure to the new political system.  As a result, a 
popular consensus slowly developed in support of the democratic 
political system.   
 
                                                          
1
  While the efficacy of adult civic education has been demonstrated (e.g. Finkel 2002; Finkel 
and Ernst 2005), it is not covered in this review since it would have to be conducted on a vast 
scale in order to have any realistic prospect of effecting broad culture change.  
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Other scholars, however, account for generational change not so much by 
changes in the content of education as by changes in the quantity and quality of 
education received by new generations which results in higher levels of 
cognitive sophistication.  Often times, such interpretations are advanced by the 
same authors, depending on the situation. For example, while Dalton 
emphasized different education content in the case of post-war Germany, his 
analysis of value change in post-war United States focuses emphasized the rapid 
expansion of university education (Dalton, 2009).  At the same time, we must 
take at least some note of the fact that the rapidly accumulating literature on 
public opinion in the new “3
rd
 Wave democracies” has, thus far, produced very 
little of important generational differences in support for democracy (e.g. Rose, 
Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 
2005; Markowski 2005; Rose, Mishler and Munro 2006; and Chu et al 2008).   
 
A second type of explanation of generational change focuses on the new and 
unique experiences encountered by the young, experiences that differ 
significantly from those of older generations and which result in the formation 
of significantly different values.  In new democracies, these experiences might 
consist of new political freedoms, civil liberties and forms of democratic 
participation that are taken for granted by younger generations with no 
memories of the pre-democratic past. Other scholars, however, focus on material 
and physiological needs and how they result in changes in subjective existential 
security. Inglehart (1990) argues that the most important influences on 
subsequent attitudes are those things that are in least supply during adolescence 
(what he calls the scarcity hypotheses), with priority going first to basic needs, 
then to material needs, and finally to post-material self-expression needs, or 
“liberty aspirations” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).   
 
 
South Africa’s political generations 
 
South Africa‟s democratization process offers a useful laboratory in which to 
begin testing these various arguments.  In addition to the vast social, economic 
and political change that South Africa has experienced since 1990, post-
apartheid South Africa has undergone rapid demographic change.  Over one 
third of South Africa‟s present electorate is now too young to have any direct 
memory of race classification, passes, or official segregation of churches, 
schools, residence and inter-personal relationships, the drastic repression of 
dissidence and resistance, or the armed resistance and popular struggle against 
apartheid.  Nor do they have any experiential memory of FW De Klerk‟s 
historic release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of liberation movements, the 
5 
searing violence of the transition period, the momentous 1994 election, or the 
conclusive 1996 passage of the country‟s Constitution.   
 
But let us first take a step back and look at the entire present day electorate.  
Post-apartheid society consists of five distinct political generations. Each 
generation is associated with an era characterized internally by continuity in 
social, economic and political trends, but which is demarcated by major 
historical disjunctures that sharply distinguish it from surrounding ears. But 
while all South Africans were shaped by the continuous trends within each era, 
they were most certainly affected in very different ways depending on their 
racial classification. The oldest, and smallest group, the Pre-Apartheid 
generation, reached their politically formative years (defined here as the age of 
16) before the historic victory of the National Party in the 1948 election and the 
imposition of race classification.  While this cohort still constituted a significant 
proportion of the electorate in 1994, it has now shrunk to less than 2 percent of 
all voters, and will be folded into in the next youngest generation in the 
empirical analysis in this paper. The next group, the Early Apartheid generation, 
comprises people who turned 16 between 1948 and 1960, meaning that they 
have no working memory of life before the rise of the National Party and the 
imposition of “petty” apartheid, or the legal matrix of laws imposing and 
enforcing racial classification and separation.  Neither would these people have 
had any experience in early adulthood of any significant popular resistance to 
apartheid.   
 
The third cohort, what I call the Grand Apartheid generation, consists of those 
citizens whose early memories were seared by the first stirrings of internal black 
resistance – the Poco uprising, and the marches that led to the Sharpeville 
massacre in 1961 – as well as foreign news of gathering decolonization and even 
Kenya‟s Mau-Mau rebellion.  Yet their memories of late adolescence and early 
adulthood also carry the recollection of the post Sharpeville reaction of the NP 
government which banned virtually all black political movements and 
imprisoned a whole generation of leaders, the most prominent being Nelson 
Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo.  Indeed, throughout most of these 
people‟s early adult lives, the apartheid system and the new Republic (South 
Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth in 1960) were marked by 
increasing confidence. Under the leadership of HF Verwoerd, the NP 
government moved toward the idea of “grand apartheid” and separate 
development through the Bantustan system with the ultimate aim of reversing 
black urbanization away from the “white” cities and suburbs and creating a 
constellation of independent black republics within the borders of white South 
Africa. During this period, African children were gradually moved out of church 
based mission schools and into government schools ordered along the new 
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principles of “Christian National Education.”  The other dominant characteristic 
of this period was South Africa‟s rapid growth and industrialization which saw a 
significant increase in African incomes, a process that itself began to sow the 
seeds of the demise of grand apartheid by attracting more and more Africans to 
urban townships to meet the expanding need for industrial labour. 
 
White confidence and African quiescence came to an abrupt end in 1976 with 
the Soweto uprisings, an event that has left its mark on virtually all South 
Africans old enough to remember, and ushered in the Struggle Generation, 
consisting of people who turned 16 between 1976 and 1996.  Indeed, several 
other important events occurred around the same time to make this an important 
watershed, such as the first television broadcast (which also allowed people to 
see first-hand coverage of the uprisings) and the increasing foreign threats to 
apartheid posed by the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and 
Mozambique as well as the new, avowedly anti-Pretoria Carter Administration 
in the United States. While the dominant picture of the petty apartheid and 
grand apartheid eras was one of acquiescence and stability, the principal theme 
of this age was violent resistance and reaction.  Several thousand young people 
left the country in the years after Soweto and headed north to seek out the exiled 
ANC (and other organizations) and obtain military training.  But it was internal 
resistance, initially -- and ironically -- sparked by the NP‟s attempts to reform 
(and save) apartheid through the 1983 Tricameral Constitution that became the 
real hallmark of the era.  The United Democratic Front linked a large number of 
church groups, civic organizations and trade unions in wide-ranging protests and 
boycotts, and triggered violent police repression, detention and bannings on the 
part of the state, culminating in two successive States of Emergency and the 
deployment of the army in black townships.  It also featured intimidation of, and 
violence against those who might consider allowing themselves to be “co-opted” 
by the new elections for “own” Houses of Parliament for Coloured and Indian 
South Africans or for “Black Local Authorities” in urban townships, or who 
participated in homeland political systems.  The UDF also became tangled in 
ongoing violent confrontation with alternative black organizations such as the 
black consciousness inspired Azanian People‟s Organization (AZAPO) and 
Inkatha, the governing party of the KwaZulu homeland.  
 
While the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela and other 
political prisoners in 1990 might be seen as the start of a new era, the sharp 
increase in political violence between 1990 and 1994 means, for our purposes, 
that it was really just a continuation of the previous years of resistance, violence 
and reaction, rather than a significant departure.  While the 1994 election and 
the passage of the 1996 Constitutions were certainly major events that left deep 
and profound memories, their real generational significance, even to an 18 year 
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old casting her first vote in 1994 or watching the ratification of the Constitution 
on television, was as the final act in a long trauma of protest, struggle and 
violence.   
 
Rather, the real watershed should be most visible in those young people who 
came of age politically after 1996.  Beginning in 1997, a group of people began 
to move through the ages of 16, 17 and 18 and enter the political arena with little 
if any first-hand experience of the trauma that came before: what are widely 
known in South Africa as the “Born Frees”. Their first political experience, 
possibly casting a vote in the 1999 election, was with a relatively normal, 
though clearly reform-minded democratic political system. While some 
backward looking dramas were still being played out, such as the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, the order of the new day was forward-looking: 
massive state investment in construction of houses and other infrastructure, the 
transformation of the state, educational reform, and growth oriented economic 
development.   
 
 
The born frees: What should we expect? 
 
Given the momentous changes just discussed, it would be logical to expect that 
the Born Free generation would be more “modern” than previous generations, 
with higher levels of education, urbanization and more cosmopolitan in their 
outlook.  However, hypotheses about the Born Frees‟ level of commitment to 
the new democratic regime differ sharply depending upon whether we focus – 
on one hand -- on the potential impacts of the newfound opportunities of the 
new political dispensation, or the new schooling curriculum and the move away 
from Bantu education, or focus – on the other hand – on the continuing legacies 
of apartheid on living conditions and the educational system.   
 
In many ways, this new cohort clearly does confront a totally different world 
than that of their parents.  There are no official limits to where they can go, work 
or live, or on whom they may date or marry.  They have experienced a series of 
post transition elections that turn on new issues and personalities with 
diminishing links to the past.  They consume news provided by a reformed 
public broadcaster, and have increasing access to privately owned radio and 
television broadcast news, as well as increasing amounts of private and 
international news on subscription cable or satellite television.  South Africa has 
also posted a long period of economic growth in the early 21
st
 century which 
was accompanied by a rapidly expanding new black middle class.  And where 
the preceding generation was often seen as the “lost generation” with months if 
not years of schooling lost to school boycotts and political violence, the “Born 
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Frees” have come through most of their schooling without politically inspired 
interruption. They are have received almost universal education in a reformed 
school system with a new curriculum and increasing numbers of black students 
attend heretofore racially exclusive schools and universities.  Thus, theories of 
socialization would provide us with strong reasons to suspect that this new 
generation, with vastly different economic and political experiences and 
opportunities than their elders, and taught under a new school curriculum, may 
provide more fertile soil in which a strong democratic culture may take root and 
help consolidate South Africa‟s fledgling democracy. 
 
Yet South Africa‟s relatively strong record of economic growth and deficit 
reduction since 1994 masks a bifurcated economy where levels of 
unemployment have hardly budged and the top and bottom of the income scales 
have moved further apart from each other than they were under apartheid.  
There is now a wider income gap between rich (the top fifth) and poor (the 
bottom fifth) blacks, than between blacks and whites as a whole (Leibbrandt and 
Levinsohn 2011; and Leibbrandt et al 2006).  In many respects, many if not 
most the “Born Frees” face the same levels of enduring unemployment, poverty, 
inequality and hopelessness – if not worse so – as their parents.  Official 
segregation has been replaced by class segregation, and the vast majority of poor 
and working class blacks still live in former townships and Bantustans.  While a 
small minority can escape to previously white schools and universities, the 
majority toil away in increasingly dysfunctional schools with poorly trained 
teachers who struggle to cope with the new curriculum. The youngest generation 
confront other limits to their life chances in the form of escalating violent crime 
and HIV infection.  From this perspective, many of the same theories of 
socialization might produce very different expectations about the political 





We begin by testing basic expectation about the basic characteristics of the Born 
Free generation.  Using a series of nationally representative surveys conducted 
by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (1998) and Afrobarometer (2000 
to 2008), we can see that the Born Frees have increased rapidly from less than 
one in twenty eligible voters in 2000 (5 percent) to almost one third just eight 
years later (31 percent).  By 2008, the Born Frees constitute the second largest 
generational cohort behind the “Struggle” generation (43 percent) but much 
larger than the “Grand Apartheid” (18 percent), “Petty Apartheid” (6 percent) 
and “Pre-Apartheid” (1 percent) cohorts. 
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Figure 1: South Africa’s political generations in the post-apartheid era 
 
But while the apparent scale and speed of demographic change in South Africa 
provides many possibilities for intergenerational differences in political outlook, 
we first need to examine the characteristics of the Born-Frees to see whether 
they in fact exhibit the kinds of structural differences that we might expect.  As a 
result of the combination of the disproportionate bulge in younger cohorts 
characteristic of rural Africa and declining family sizes amongst white, coloured 
and Indian South Africans (as well as urban blacks Africans) and white 
emigration, the Born Frees are the most likely of all generations to be black (83 
percent) and rural (43 percent) (Figures 2 and 3). Increased expenditures in 
education and school-building programs have not, however, had any noticeable 
impact on educational attainment.  In fact, the Born-Frees are slightly less likely 
to have at least obtained a high school degree (48 percent) than the preceding 
Struggle generation (52 percent) (Figure 4).  Beyond formal education, the data 
also indicate that they are not any more “cosmopolitan” than their older 
counterparts:  they are not any more likely to be multi-lingual than the Struggle 
cohort (Figure 5) nor are they any more likely to report using a cell phone, 
computer or internet (Figure 6).  They do, however, exhibit the lowest levels of 
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Figure 2: Generation and race, 2008 
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Figure 4: Generation and education, 2008 
 
 
Figure 5: Generation and linguistic ability, 2008 
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Figure 6: Generation and technology, 2008 
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Figure 8: Generation and religiosity, 2008 
 
 
In the last two graphs, I examine generational differences in “commitment to 
democracy.”  Commitment to democracy is a multi-item construct consisting of 
respondents‟ answers to the widely used survey question on support for 
democracy (“democracy is always best”) and rejection of three forms of non-
democratic alternatives: military rule, one-party rule, and presidential 
dictatorship (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). The result can be 
expressed either as the percentage of respondents who support democracy and 
reject all three non democratic alternatives (Figure 9), or as a mean score on a 
five point index that runs from 0-4 (Figure 10).  These figures reveal two things.  
First, there seems to be little generational differences since Afrobarometer began 
asking these questions in South Africa in 2000. Second, there is no evidence that 
the Born Frees are more committed to democracy. In fact, they appear to often 
be the least committed.   
 
But do these generational breakdowns of commitment for democracy obscure 
age-related differences that might emerge once we statistically control for other 
trends. I identify a set of potential predictor variables and cluster them into 
different theoretical families.  First of all, in order to tap the direct effect of the 
political generations identified above, I use dummy variables for the “Born 
























Africa‟s Struggle Generation as the reference group. To ensure that any 
observed generational differences are not just a reflection of other demographic 
differences, I then add controls for gender, urban-rural, and racial differences 
(with dummy variables for white, coloured and Indian South Africans with black 
as the reference category). 
 
To tap the purest impacts of “socialization-as-teaching,” I then enter a group of 
variables that measure formal education, news media use, membership in 
religious and community groups, cognitive sophistication, and political 
knowledge (measured here as the respondent‟s ability to identify a range of 
incumbent office-holders).  To measure the potential impacts of “socialization-
through-new political conditions,” I use variables that ask respondents about 
people‟s ability to enjoy a range of newfound freedoms (such as speech and 
movement), and their evaluations of the extent of equal treatment of all citizens, 
the secrecy of the vote, the freeness and fairness of the last election, and the 
responsiveness of elected officials to public opinion.  To get at the potential 
impact of culture change through “habituation,” or learning by doing, I look at 
whether or not people had voted in the previous election, participated in 
community meetings and action groups, or taken part in violent protests.  
Finally, to get at culture change through “physiological and economic 
(in)security,” I use measures of unemployment, the Afrobarometer index of 
lived poverty, and questions that ask people whether they had been victims of, 
and feared crime, whether they had been victimized by corrupt officials, and 
whether or not they had lost a close friend or family members to AIDS.  All of 
these are tested for in general, but more importantly through interaction 
variables that test for their unique impact amongst the Born Free generation. 
 
Using the most recent, 2008, South Africa Afrobarometer survey, I now test for 
the effects of these variables through a full multivariate regression. These results 
show that holding constant for a wide range of individual level attitudes, 
behaviours and demographic characteristics, respondents belonging to the Born 
Free cohort are significantly less likely to be committed to democracy than other 
South Africans.  Moreover, virtually none of the variables we would ordinarily 
see as channels or mechanism of socialization (formal education, cognitive 
sophistication, or civic group membership) have shape attitudes. Once we 
control for people‟s evaluations of their new political conditions, we find that 
white respondents are appreciably more supportive of democracy, but whether 
or not this reflects differential socialization patterns within that community, or 
something else, remains to be seen.   
 
Indicators of democratic habituation have some positive impact.  Those who 
attend community meetings and join local action groups are significantly more 
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democratic. But those who have participated in violent protests are less so.  
There is also a strong impact of living in an urban area. This might reflect the 
quality of schooling (regardless of the level reached). But it might also reflect 
better social services and infrastructure, and needs further scrutiny in subsequent 
analysis.   
 
The greatest impacts on democratic commitment, by far, are exercised by 
people‟s experiences with the political system and the economy.  Those who 
feel the new political system successfully protects individual freedoms and 
guarantees a secret vote are much more likely to support democracy.  
Conversely, those who have been victimized by extortion at the hands of corrupt 
bureaucrats, who do not have a job, and who face grinding poverty are less 
democratic (yet, those who say they have a lost a close friend or family member 
to the AIDS pandemic are more likely to embrace democracy).  
  
Yet while we have seen that the Born Free generation is less democratic, all the 
negative coefficient of a dummy variable really tells us is that the intercept for 
this cohort is lower than for the reference group (the Struggle generation).  The 
important question, however, is whether the other variables have different 
effects (slopes) across different generational cohorts. Ultimately, this is a 
question best exercised by examining the interaction of generational dummy 
variables and each of the other independent variables.  As a first cut, however, I 
simply re-estimate this model amongst three generational groups: the Born 
Frees, the Struggle Generation, and among older South Africans.  The positive 
impacts of perceived freedom and a secret ballot, and the negative impact of 
being a victim of official extortion are relatively constant across generations.  
The role of urban residence, community participation, and being white are 
common to both the Born Free and Struggle generation, but not significant 
amongst older citizens (and the impact of being urban and being white are about 
twice as large amongst young people).  The unique effects of being a member of 
the Born Free generation appear to be that contact with elected leaders reduces 
commitment to democracy, but violent protest has no effect (while it is 
correlated with reduced commitment among other citizens), and unemployment 
fails to have the same negative effect that it does amongst the middle aged 
Struggle generation. 
Table 1: Explaining democratic commitment (0-4) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 2.88     1.83 
Political Generations 
(Struggle=Reference) 
      
Born Free (0-1) -.154*** -.127** -.124* -107** -.092* -.076* 
Grand Apartheid (0-1) -.101* -.100* NS NS -.093* -.112* 
Pre/Early Apartheid (0-1) NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Demographic Controls 
(Black=Reference) 
      
Urban (0-1)  .299*** .243*** .180*** .192*** .156*** 
Female (0-1)  -.071* NS NS NS NS 
White (0-1)  NS NS .300*** .325*** .251*** 
Coloured  (0-1)  NS NS NS NS NS 
Indian (0-1)  NS NS NS NS NS 
Socialization by Teaching       
Formal Education  (0-9)   NS NS NS NS 
News Media Use (0-5)   .058* NS NS NS 
Religious Group Membership (0-2)   NS NS -.045* -.044* 
Community Group Membership (0-2 )   -.087*** NS NS NS 
Cognitive Engagement (0-3)   .051* NS NS NS 
Knows Incumbents (0-2)   .120** .118*** -.098** .085* 
Socialization Through Political 
Conditions 
      
People Enjoy Freedoms (0-4)    .235*** .232*** .212*** 
Vote Is Secret (0-4)    .145*** .134*** .133*** 
Elections Free and Fair (0-4)    .044** NS NS 
 
Able to Make Voice Heard (0-4)    -.043*** -.041*** -.042*** 
Elected Leaders Listen to Us (0-4)    NS NS NS 
People Treated Equally (0-4)    NS NS -.026* 
Learning by Doing       
Voted (0-1)     NS NS 
Community Participation (0-4)     .116*** .098*** 
Formal Contact (0-3)     -.090** NS 
Violent Protest (0-4)     -.120*** -.099*** 
Physical and Material In/Security       
Victim of Official Corruption (0-4)      -.146*** 
Criminal Insecurity (0-4)      NS 
Unemployed (0-1)      -.126*** 
Lived Poverty (0-4)      -.062** 
Personal Loss to AIDS (0-1)      .119*** 
       
Adjusted R
2
 .006 .035 .050 .203 .218 .232 
N 2400 2400 2400 2373 2322 2307 
Cells report unstandardized multivariate regression coefficients (b‟s).  Dependant variable is the Index of Commitment to 
Democracy (which is an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one party 
and one man rule) 
  
 
Table 2: Explaining Democratic Commitment (0-4) Across Generational Cohorts 
 




Constant 1.83 1.65 2.00 1.59 
Political Generations 
(Struggle=Reference) 
    
Born Free (0-1) -.076* -- -- -- 
Grand Apartheid (0-1) -.112* -- -- -- 
Pre/Early Apartheid (0-1) NS -- -- -- 
Demographic Controls (Black=Reference)     
Urban (0-1) .156*** .222*** .148** NS 
Female (0-1) NS NS NS NS 
White (0-1) .251*** .412*** .228** NS 
Coloured  (0-1) NS NS NS NS 
Indian (0-1) NS NS NS NS 
Socialization by Teaching     
Formal Education (0-9) NS NS NS NS 
News Media Use (0-5) NS NS NS NS 
Religious Group Membership (0-2 ) -.044* -.115** NS NS 
Community Group Membership (0-2) NS -.108** NS NS 
Cognitive Engagement (0-3) NS NS NS NS 
Knows Incumbents (0-2) .085* NS NS NS 
Socialization Through Political 
Conditions 
    
People Enjoy Freedoms (0-4) .212*** .238*** .208*** .178*** 
Vote Is Secret (0-4) .133*** .128*** .144*** .137*** 
 
Elections Free and Fair (0-4) NS NS NS NS 
Able to Make Voice Heard (0-4) -.042*** NS -.065*** NS 
Elected Leaders Listen to Us (0-4) NS NS NS NS 
People Treated Equally (0-4) -.026* NS NS NS 
Learning by Doing     
Voted (0-1) NS NS NS NS 
Community Participation (0-4) .098*** .111*** .105*** NS 
Formal Contact (0 3) NS -.157** NS NS 
Violent Protest (0-4) -.099*** NS -.119* -.200*** 
Physical and Material In/Security     
Victim of Official Corruption (0-4) -.146*** -.150** -.119** -.186** 
Criminal Insecurity (0-4) NS NS NS NS 
Unemployed (0-1) -.126*** NS -.130* NS 
Lived Poverty (0-4) -.062** -.080* -.081* NS 
Personal Loss to AIDS (0-1) .119*** .208*** .142* NS 
     
Adjusted R
2
 .232 .258 .279 .175 
N 2307 707 993 582 
Cells report unstandardized multivariate regression coefficients (b‟s).  Dependant variable is the Index of Commitment to 
Democracy (which is an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one party 
and one man rule) 
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Finally, we take note of two findings about formal education.  First, in contrast 
to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa where formal education (at least up to high 
school) makes a substantial contribution to support for democracy (Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes and 
Mughogho 2010), education has no significant impact across the South African 
population. This is understandable given that neither black nor white South 
Africans were exposed to pro-democratic teachings in the school curriculum, or 
certainly not of a non-racial inclusive democracy.  But what may be of greater 
concern is the second finding, that increasing levels of formal education fail to 
contribute to pro-democratic support amongst the “born free” respondents.  
Clearly, if South Africa‟s educational reformers intended that the schools would 
be the training site of new democratic citizens, something has gone terribly 
wrong.  The new “outcomes-based” Curriculum 2005, introduced in 1997 and 
revised in 2002, was supposed to promote a series of values conducive to 
democratic citizenship.  But, perhaps because of their attraction to “social 
constructivism” and the relative status of knowledge, the framers of the new 
curriculum seem to have been embarrassed at the prospect of replacing one 
official orthodoxy with another (Allais 2009).  Thus, along with non-racialism 
and non-sexism, the curriculum attempts to embody democratic values across a 
range of “learning areas” such as arts and culture, life orientation, and social 
studies. But there is no place for the explicit teaching and discussion of 
democratic government, let alone the value and superiority of democracy as a 
form of government.  To be sure, it is clearly possible to teach democratic values 
implicitly through a range of innovative methods, such as group participation 
and problem solving, but this requires highly skilled teachers who are provided 
with a great deal of curricular guidance and institutional support, both of which 





In 1994, the combined prospects of demographic change and a radically changed 
political system might have held out the promise of rapid movement toward a 
transformed citizenry, based primarily on an emerging post-apartheid 
generation imbued with the values of the new South African citizen.  To be sure, 
we have only tested for one of these values; and similar enquires should focus 
on other variables such as national identity, racism, government legitimacy, and 
participation.  But as far as democracy goes, the post-apartheid generation 
remain as “lukewarm” as their parents and grandparents. Rather than re-drawing 
the country‟s main cleavages along lines of age and generation (as in post-war 
Germany), the key fault have been replicated within the new generation.  
Whatever advantages might have accrued from the new political experiences of 
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freedom, liberty and self-government seem to have been neutralized by the 
disadvantages of enduring unemployment, poverty and corruption.  Fifteen years 
on, South Africa‟s democracy remains as dependant on performance-based 
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